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 This thesis models the interaction between corporate governance and trade 
liberalization to examine how the interaction effect influences firm performance. The 
increase in world trade has outpaced world output and world GDP in recent decades, and 
scholars and policymakers alike are showing greater interest in the impact of trade 
liberalization on market structure. The removal of barriers to trade exposes firms to 
increased product market competition, but at the same time, freer trade also promotes 
growth opportunities by opening up foreign markets.  
In this vein, this paper examines the macro-micro linkage of trade liberalization 
and firm performance by investigating how corporate governance enables firms to 
enhance those growth opportunities. The methodology benefits from exploiting a quasi-
natural experiment, the enactment of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which 
provides plausible exogenous variations in trade shocks that mitigate simultaneity and 
endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the study constructs its main corporate governance 
variable by exploiting the outside director system for publicly listed firms in Korea. 
Since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, Korean statutory law has mandated a minimum 
ratio of outside directors to board size for firms traded on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
indices. This standardization across firms enables a convenient setup which mitigates 
selection bias. 
The findings from this study provide empirical evidence of the interaction 
effect between corporate governance and trade liberalization and its positive influence 
on firm performance. The main hypothesis, that firms with better corporate governance 
reap greater benefits from the expansion in trade opportunities, is supported by findings 
which are robust across many alternative specifications. Using a sample of publicly listed 
manufacturing firms in Korea from 2009 to 2014, this thesis finds that the interaction 
effect remains significant even when tested with different and complementary measures 
of independent and dependent variables in addition to an array of control variables. 
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 In the current era of global trade, trade liberalization is an unambiguously 
favorable shock for firms to grow through the expansion in export opportunities. While 
the macro-micro linkages of international trade and firm behavior have been investigated 
by scholars and policymakers alike, there has been relatively scant attention paid to the 
influence of corporate governance on firm outcomes from trade liberalization. Most of 
the analysis considering both corporate governance and trade liberalization has focused 
on how product market competition, which increases due to the removal of import 
barriers, acts as a governance mechanism (e.g. Giroud and Mueller 2010). A handful of 
studies have examined the reverse effect of how a firm’s corporate governance influences 
its response to foreign competition (e.g. Guadalupe and Wulf 2010). 
Evidence on how governance mechanisms enhance firms’ abilities to benefit 
from an increase in trade opportunities remains the scarcest, even despite the growing 
consensus that corporate governance influences firms’ ability to export (Minetti, Murro 
and Zhu 2015). Agency theory stipulates that corporate governance structures influence 
a firm’s strategic decisions; it is therefore plausible that corporate governance enhances 
a firm’s ability to take advantage of the increase in growth opportunities from exports. 
In fact, the influence of corporate governance on firm export propensity is well-
documented in both developed and emerging markets (Lu, Xu and Liu 2009). However, 
corporate governance is rarely examined in tandem with growth opportunities from trade 
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liberalization, even though the removal of trade barriers increases the likelihood that 
firms will participate in the export market. As a case in point, Baldwin and Gu (2004) 
found that after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was enacted, Canadian 
manufacturing plants, even those which previously did not export, were more likely to 
export to the U.S. 
 This thesis addresses the gap in extant literature. It provides empirical evidence 
on the interaction effect between corporate governance and trade liberalization and its 
positive influence on firm performance. The main hypothesis, that firms with better 
corporate governance reap greater benefits from the expansion in trade opportunities, is 
supported by findings which are robust across many alternative specifications. Using a 
sample of publicly listed manufacturing firms in Korea from 2009 to 2014, this thesis 
finds that the interaction effect remains significant even when tested with different and 
complementary measures of independent and dependent variables in addition to an array 
of control variables. 
The methodological rigor of this study comes from exploiting a quasi-natural 
experiment: the enactment of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS 
FTA) in 2012. The KORUS FTA, which immediately eliminated 82% of U.S. and 80% 
of Korean tariff duties after it was entered into effect1, presents a trade shock which is 
exogenous to firm corporate governance and other firm-level variables. Thus, it provides 
                                            
 
1 These figures represent only the percentage of goods for which tariffs were immediately 
removed; the provisions of the FTA actually eliminate 95% of each nation’s tariffs on goods 
within five years. 
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plausible exogenous variations in trade opportunities that mitigate simultaneity and 
endogeneity concerns. Since the pre-FTA tariffs varied widely across industries, there 
are measurable cross-sectional variations in both growth opportunity and product market 
competition. Moreover, Korea’s exports in goods to the U.S. soared after the FTA and 
its trade surplus in goods doubled2. [Figure 1] illustrates how Korea’s exports to the U.S. 
have been on the rise while imports from the U.S. faced a steady decline. This provides 
an empirical setting where Korean exports significantly outpace U.S. imports. Thus, this 
study utilizes a setting in which the improvement in trade opportunities for Korean firms 
is plausible and observable, since the removal of import tariff barriers did not lead to an 
influx of American goods hindering such opportunities. 
Additionally, the study constructs its main corporate governance variable by 
exploiting the outside director system for publicly listed firms in Korea. Since the 1997-
98 Asian financial crisis, Korean statutory law has mandated a minimum ratio of outside 
directors to board size for firms traded on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ indices. In status 
quo, firms with asset sizes of more than 2 trillion won must maintain at least a 50% ratio 
of outside directors to total number of board members, while firms with asset sizes below 
2 trillion won are required to have at least 25%. This standardization across firms 
establishes a convenient setup which mitigates extraneous factors and selection bias. 
[Figure 2] illustrates the steady increase in the percentage of outside directors on the 
                                            
 
2 Korea’s trade surplus in goods with the U.S. increased from $14.7 billion in 2011 (the last 
year before the FTA was enacted) to $26.6 billion in 2014. 
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board for publicly listed firms in Korea. Furthermore, the wealth of evidence on the 
positive influence of outside directors on firm performance in Korea strengthens the 
assumption for the main corporate governance variable in this study. Choi, Park and Yoo 
(2007) found that outside directors instituted after the Asian financial crisis had a 
significantly positive effect on firm performance; this finding in the Korean setting 
marks an interesting departure from similar studies done in other settings which 
produced negligible results (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Mehran 1995, Kesner 
1987).  
This thesis begins by exploring how the removal of tariff barriers affects 
operating performance. The ratio of outside directors is coded as a dummy variable, and 
for firms with an outside director ratio that is above the mandated minimum, the dummy 
is interacted with a variable which measures the reduction in export tariffs. Firm fixed 
effects are included to control for time invariant differences in corporate governance and 
export-related competition. The baseline model shows that on average, ROA increased 
for the firms in the sample. The ratio of outside directors and the reduction in tariffs from 
the FTA each had an independent positive influence on ROA. When combined, the 
interaction between outside directorship ratio and lower export tariffs was also positive 
and statistically significant. The results also remain robust even when the drops in import 
tariffs and the subsequent increase in foreign competition are considered. 
This study then examines whether the results show variations depending on 
firm and industry heterogeneity. Extant literature has found a causal link between trade 
liberalization and firm productivity (e.g. Topalova and Khandelwal 2011, Hu and Liu 
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2014)3, and firm productivity is known to be correlated with firm age and firm size (e.g. 
Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer 1999, Aw, Chen and Roberts 2001, Van Biesebroek 
2005). Following in the lines of inquiry of previous studies which find that trade 
liberalization induces market share reallocation, thereby leading to productivity gains 
(Pavcnick 2002, Melitz 2003, Chevassus-Lozza, Gaigné and Le Mener 2013), this thesis 
theorizes that better corporate governance and a subsequent increase in trade 
opportunities will produce the most benefits for firms with the highest levels of 
productivity and firms which have survived past the first stage of development. 
Consistent with this notion, the empirical results show that when trade opportunities 
increase, better corporate governance amplifies the positive impact especially for larger 
firms, older firms, and firms with higher productivity. Additionally, the results remain 
positive and significant when controlling for industry competitiveness and reliance on 
external capital. 
Further robustness checks are conducted by addressing potential 
methodological concerns. It is possible that the magnitude of the reduction in tariffs was 
correlated with industry characteristics in the pre-FTA period, and thus the model 
captures inherent industry characteristics instead of the change in trade opportunities. To 
                                            
 
3 Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) observed that the bi-directional changes in tariffs as a result 
of trade liberalization improved productivity for Indian firms. The changes in export tariffs 
improved competitiveness of final goods while the changes in import tariffs generated greater 
access to inputs for such goods. In similar vein, Hu and Liu (2014) also found that export tariff 
reduction and import tariff reduction independently impact productivity for Chinese 
manufacturing firms. Interestingly, their findings show that export tariff reduction decreased 
productivity while import tariff reduction had an enhancing effect. 
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mitigate this concern, control variables are employed to include and test for relevant 
industry characteristics. Also, the the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is included to 
control for industry market structure, and HHI is interacted with the outside directorship 
ratio in similar fashion to Giroud and Mueller (2010), who interacted HHI and a 
governance variable 4  to examine corporate governance in competitive industries.  
Finally, this study adopts alternative measures for governance, namely institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership, and for performance, namely Tobin’s q and stock 
returns. The results remain positive and significant. 
The following section presents the analytical framework, hypotheses, and 
literature review are discussed, followed by a description of the statistical specification, 
data sources, variable construction, and definitions. The empirical results are then 
presented along with robustness checks, and the thesis concludes with a discussion of 
the implications and limitations of the findings.  
                                            
 
4 Giroud and Mueller (2010) exploit the passage of 30 business combination laws, which 




II. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
This section proceeds as follows. First, a comprehensive literature review 
examines extant literature related to the topic of this thesis. Past studies have investigated 
the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and the impact of trade 
liberalization on market structure – and therefore trade opportunities, as well as product 
market competition – as independent phenomena. Following the summaries of extant 
work on each line of inquiry is a review of the small but significant body of literature 
pertaining to the combination of corporate governance and trade liberalization as 
variables of interest.  
 Afterwards, the unique facts of the empirical context of this study are 
elaborated in greater detail through a review of Korea’s corporate governance reforms 
and mandatory outside directorship law, followed by a summary of relevant facts about 
the KORUS FTA. Finally, the section concludes by elucidating the theoretical constructs 
for hypothesis formulation. 
 
2.1. Literature Review 
2.1.1. Corporate governance and firm performance 
 The simplest explanation of corporate governance defines it as a system which 
balances the different needs of a firm’s stakeholders and controls internal and external 
corporate structures to alleviate the age-old agency problem between owners and 
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managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Corporate disciplinary mechanisms can be 
categorized into internal corporate governance, which can be carried out by the board of 
directors, auditors, controlling shareholders, and other actors who directly monitor 
managers – as stipulated in the classical ‘theory of the firm’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Fama 1980) – or external corporate governance, which encompasses securities analysts, 
the labor market for managers, the market for corporate control, anti-takeover measures, 
and the like (Cremers and Nair 2005). There is a deterrence effect at micro- and macro-
levels of the firm as managers and firms both face the threat of exits and are thus 
discouraged from incurring agency costs, thereby improving firm performance. In 
addition, stringent corporate governance and monitoring encourages higher firm 
valuation since potential investors and other actors in the market perceive less risk. 
A considerable body of work supports that corporate governance – both internal 
and external – and firm value are positively linked in developed markets (e.g. Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick 2003, Bruno and Claessens 2010). The large literature on corporate 
governance in emerging markets has likewise generated a positive correlation. Single-
country studies concerning firms in countries such as India (e.g. Black and Khanna 2007), 
Russia (e.g. Black 2001, Black, Love and Rachofsky 2006), China (e.g. Mohamed, Zhou 
and Amin 2016) have supported the hypothesis that good corporate governance exerts a 
positive influence on firm market value. Cross-country studies (e.g. Klapper and Love 
2004, Anderson and Gupta 2009) present similar findings, albeit with some variations 
resulting from country-level differences. A prominent example is the study done by 
Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2012), which examined corporate governance in Brazil 
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and compared the results with findings from Russia, India and Korea, ultimately 
suggesting that firm governance practices as a whole predict higher firm performance 
but also pointing out that country characteristics affect which specific practices can 
predict firm market value and which firms have such an association. 
In Korea, the setting of this thesis, a multitude of empirical evidence supports 
that governance mechanisms have a positive and significant association with firm 
performance (Baek, Kang and Park 2004, Black, Jang and Kim 2006, Choi, Park and 
Yoo 2007), even when the concept of corporate governance was virtually unknown in 
the pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis period (Joh 2003). Interestingly, this relationship is 
especially pronounced for governance variables related to board characteristics (e.g. 
Black, Jang and Kim 2006, Choi, Park and Yoo 2007, Black and Kim 2012). However, 
Black et al. (2015) point out that most of extant literature concerning corporate 
governance and firm value suffers from deficiencies in time series data, thereby making 
firm fixed effects infeasible and creating an overreliance on OLS regressions. A lack of 
fixed effects gives rise to the potential for unobserved firm-level factors to confound the 
results. Thus, a minor objective of this thesis is to perform an additional check on the 
relationship between governance and firm performance with the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects for control for time invariant differences in corporate governance. Overall, there 
is strong support in extant literature of the causal link between corporate governance and 
firm performance. 
Within the corporate governance literature, board composition and shareholder 
orientation have been explored frequently because of ample empirical evidence showing 
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that such monitoring mechanisms can determine whether a firm can acquire necessary 
finances and other important resources as well as access to information (e.g. Allen and 
Gale 1999). In particular, outside directors have received special attention from 
academics, corporations and policymakers alike because of their critical role as 
independent members of the board of directors. Although external stakeholders such as 
institutional investors also monitor firms, for example through proxy voting, and 
ultimately influence firm performance (e.g. Lee 2015), outside directors on the board 
can exert direct influence on firm investment decisions and other performance related-
factors (Jensen and Meckling 1976). According to the theory of the firm, outside 
directors are best able to fulfill monitoring functions in the firm because of their 
independence from management and their incentive to maintain their reputation as 
experts (Fama 1980, Kaplan and Reishus 1990). Aside from their monitoring role, 
outside directors also contribute to firm performance by providing valuable insight and 
experience based on their own expertise (McDonald, Westphal and Graebner 2008) as 
well as that of their network ties, such as through board interlocks (Mizruchi 1996). 
Beyond the ivory tower, the topic of independent outside directors has been an 
important focus of corporate governance reforms in many countries as of late5. For these 
reasons, the ratio of outside directors to board size – since it can be reasonably assumed 
that a higher ratio of outside directors is correlated with better monitoring functions – 
                                            
 
5 In extant literature, the corporate governance structures of Germany and Japan, especially 
with regard to independent outside directors, are often compared with that of the U.S., and to a 
lesser extent, the U.K. 
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can serve as a reliable measure of corporate governance which influences firm 
performance. As the forthcoming subsections will show, the ratio of outside directors is 
a significant variable in the Korean setting due to unique specifications of the mandatory 
outside directorship law. 
2.1.2. Trade liberalization and market structure 
For FTAs, trade liberalization is bilateral, but the impact of trade liberalization 
on growth opportunities – resulting from the reduction in export tariffs, thereby 
removing barriers to export to overseas markets – has not been investigated as 
extensively as the comparable effect on product market competition, the latter of which 
results from intensified foreign competition due to the removal of import barriers. The 
influence of trade liberalization on growth is somewhat controversial because so far there 
has been greater attention paid to the tendency for imports to increase over exports, 
creating trade deficits. For instance, in most of the studies which examine the 1989 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the findings showed that competition intensified 
for U.S. firms because of the rise in imports from Canada (e.g. Munirathinam, Marchant 
and Reed 1997, Clausing 2001, Head and Ries 2001).  
However, the findings from those studies also indirectly supported the 
hypothesis that Canadian firms benefitted from enhanced growth opportunities due to 
trade liberalization. While it would be fallacious to claim that trade liberalization is a 
zero-sum game, it follows logically that if countries engage in a trade pact and one 
partner faces increased competition from an influx of imports, then another partner may 
be benefitting due to increased growth opportunities from exporting more goods. This is 
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not to say that there will always be winners and losers in free trade. For instance, 
developing countries which opened up to international trade and unilaterally reduced 
tariffs and other trade barriers – China being a prominent example – enjoyed tremendous 
economic growth while their trading partners also benefitted from greater access to 
foreign inputs (see, e.g., Bas 2012 for empirical evidence of this assertion). In addition, 
the OECD (2011) estimates that halving the trade barriers among G20 economies would 
induce significant job growth, higher real wages, and increased exports. 
Despite this, previous research on the growth opportunities from trade 
liberalization gives conflicting results (e.g. Santos-Paulino 2002, Dutta and Ahmed 2004, 
Narayan and Smyth 2005, Ratnaike 2012). Pacheco-López (2005) attempted to isolate 
the outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the balance of 
trade in Mexico and concluded that while trade reforms during the mid-1980s influenced 
imports and exports, the NAFTA itself had a negligible effect on exports. On the other 
hand, the cointegration analysis in Ahmed (2000) produces robust data to support that 
trade liberalization in Bangladesh improved the country’s export performance. 
Nonetheless, multilateral economic initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership – 
which holds the distinction of being the largest trade agreement in history (Nakamura 
2016) – being negotiated by some of the most powerful economies in the world, there is 
a salient need to empirically investigate how trade liberalization impacts growth 
opportunities, not only at the macroeconomic level, but also at the microeconomic level.  
Trade liberalization has also been found to affect export decisions for firms, as 
illustrated by studies examining the removal of trade barriers and firm entry into the 
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export market (Melitz 2003, Bernard and Jensen 2004, Bas 2012, Chevassus-Lozza, 
Gaigné and Le Mener 2013). In general, there are two interconnected mechanisms that 
enable trade liberalization to influence firms to enter the export market. The first is 
dependent on the assertion that without trade liberalization, only the most productive 
plants – which are capable of overcoming trade barriers – participate in the export market. 
When all tariff barriers fall, then even firms that did not previously export can now begin 
exporting, and the export market becomes bigger. In their study of Canadian 
manufacturing plants, Baldwin and Gu (2004) found empirical evidence of this exact 
phenomena; that is, free trade between Canada and the U.S. encouraged previously non-
exporting firms to enter the export market, leading to a significant increase in the number 
of exporter plants. The second is related to the removal of import tariffs, which 
subsequently reduces the costs of inputs and therefore makes exporting final goods or 
services produced with those inputs an attractive option for firms. This is supported by 
Amiti and Konings (2007), who studied Indonesian manufacturing plants over a 10-year 
period and concluded that the largest productivity gains from trade liberalization result 
from the reduction of input tariffs. This finding is also consistent with the first assertion 
that more productive firms are more likely to export. 
2.1.3. Corporate governance and trade liberalization 
 Corporate governance and trade liberalization have been studied in tandem 
through the lens of increased product market competition. In relevant literature, studies 
have consistently found that the positive influence of better corporate governance on 
firm performance is dampened by greater product market competition (e.g. Chou et al. 
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2011, Giroud and Mueller 2011). For outcomes on firm productivity, competition and 
corporate governance were found to be complements since firms experienced higher 
productivity growth when intense market competition was prevalent and when tight 
ownership control was exercised (e.g. Januszewski, Köke and Winter 20026). In addition, 
product market competition itself can affect internal corporate governance. In their study 
of Korean firms, Byun, Lee and Park (2012) found that product market competition 
improves internal governance mechanisms; moreover, the effectiveness of the board of 
directors was a critical factor which affected how the interaction of product market 
competition and corporate governance influenced firm performance. This further 
supports previous studies which highlight the importance of the board of directors for 
corporate governance in Korea. 
 The findings in extant literature can draw the general conclusion that corporate 
governance and product market competition can be substitutes if competition serves as 
an external disciplining mechanism or complements if they interact to influence firm 
outcomes. This thesis asserts that a similar logic holds for growth opportunities from 
trade liberalization, but with a twist. When export barriers are removed, firms may be 
incentivized to improve corporate governance for various reasons, such as tapping into 
the expertise of outside directors who have relevant trade-related experience, or 
attempting to improve corporate transparency to increase the likelihood of securing 
                                            
 
6 Although this particular study did not measure product market competition resulting directly 
from trade liberalization, it utilized HHI and similar firm-level and industry-level characteristics 
to this thesis. 
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external financing to expand operations. Ultimately, firms with better corporate 
governance are better positioned to benefit from the trade opportunities following the 
reduction of export tariffs, and will have better performance as a result. This is elaborated 
further in later sections. 
 
2.2. The Case of Korea 
The empirical setting of this study provides many advantages to examining the 
proposed interaction because of Korea’s unique history of corporate governance 
regulation as well as exposure to the international market. While corporate governance 
in Korea is often criticized, described by unflattering phenomena such as the ‘Korea 
Discount’7, there are a plethora of studies which find a positive correlation between 
corporate governance mechanisms and operating performance. In particular, outside 
directors in Korea have been found to have a significant and positive effect (e.g. Black, 
Jang and Kim 2006, Choi Park and Yoo 2007) in contrast to the insignificant associations 
found for studies set in other countries (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Mehran 1995, 
Kesner 1987). 
Furthermore, the impact of increased trade opportunities is amplified in the 
Korean setting due to the country’s export-based economy – as it is the world’s fifth 
                                            
 
7 The forward price-earnings ratio for Korea is much lower than those of its counterparts in 
advanced economies. This is often termed the ‘Korea Discount’ and the undervaluation of 
Korean stocks is attributed to low corporate transparency and poor corporate governance of 
Korean firms. 
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largest export economy8 – and its competitiveness in the global market. According to 
the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2016), Korea has an Economic Complexity 
Index of 1.82, making it the sixth most complex country in the world according to the 
Economic Complexity Index; also, Korea has a revealed comparative advantage in 249 
product categories9. These figures indicate that Korea’s exports to the world are far larger 
than would be expected from an economy and country of its size. Therefore, the removal 
of export barriers represents a tremendous growth opportunity for the Korean economy 
and consequently for Korean firms.  
2.2.1. Korea’s Corporate Governance 
 To understand why Korean companies are statutorily required to have a certain 
ratio of outside directors to board size, it is important to note that Korea’s corporate 
governance structure is different from those of comparable economies due largely in part 
to the country’s unique growth trajectory. Scholars have coined terms such as 
‘compressed modernity’ (Chang 1999) and ‘rush-to development’ (Han 1998) to 
characterize the explosive speed with which Korea underwent industrialization. During 
a period when economic growth took precedence over all else, corporate governance 
measures and regulations took a back seat. Low profitability persisted but capital 
continued to flow into unprofitable projects, and outrageously high debt-equity ratios for 
conglomerates were a testament to the fact that financial institutions were not performing 
                                            
 
8 The figure comes from data in 2015 according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
9 The figures come from data in 2015 according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
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proper monitoring functions (Joh 2004). Eventually, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
toppled the unstable foundations which the Korean economy was built upon, and it soon 
became apparent that the national foreign debt could not be repaid without assistance.  
At this point, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in and ordered 
the Korean financial sector to undergo large-scale restructuring in exchange for a (now-
controversial) aid package. [Table 1] summarizes the reforms demanded by the IMF. 
There is a virtually universal consensus among scholars that corporate governance 
failure was one of the main causes of the financial crisis (e.g. Johnson et al. 2000, Joh 
2004), and it was amidst this backdrop that mandatory outside directors for listed 
companies were implemented in Korea a year after the currency crisis. Independent 
directors were expected to improve corporate governance for Korean firms since family 
ownership and disproportionate control of large conglomerates often gave rise to 
principal-principal problems in addition to traditional principal-agent problems (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 1999). The government enforced stricter 
regulation of the qualifications of outside directors to ensure that they were unaffiliated 
and independent actors. 
By 1999, all Korean listed firms were obligated to have a board of directors 
with a minimum of 25% outside directors, and large firms with assets exceeding 2 trillion 
won were required to have a 50% outside directorship ratio. Despite its shortcomings, 
the mandatory outside directorship ratio has contributed to increasing corporate 
transparency and most importantly, improving monitoring functions of the board of 
directors (Chun 2016). Understandably, an overwhelming majority of studies which 
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examine the contribution of outside directors to firm performance or utilize outside 
directors as a proxy for corporate governance have conducted empirical analyses by 
exploiting the implementation of the mandatory outside director system in 1998 as an 
exogenous shock (see, e.g., Baek, Kang and Park 2004, Cho and Kim 2007, Choi, Park 
and Yoo 2007, Black and Kim 2012). It is worth noting that in general, even though 
there is a positive significant relationship between outside directors and firm 
performance, the magnitude of the impact is weak.  
Nonetheless, the board of directors is an important governance variable in the 
Korean setting. Black and Kim (2008) found empirical evidence to support that board 
structure reforms led to higher profitability for firms, and Black et al. (2015) constructed 
a comprehensive corporate governance index of Korean firms and found that the positive 
influence of variables in the index on firm market value are principally driven by board 
structure. Moreover, this result was strengthened when the 1999 regulatory shock 
mandating a 50% outside directorship ratio for large firms was instrumented for board 
structure.  
2.2.2. The Korea-U.S. FTA 
 Although the trade growth between the U.S. and Korea has been overshadowed 
in recent years by soaring trade with China, which is now Korea’s leading trade partner, 
the Korea-U.S. bilateral economic relationship remains one of the most important 
partnerships. The U.S. is second only to China as the top destination for Korean exports, 
and as early as 2005, South Korea superseded France and Italy to become the 7th largest 
trading partner as well as a major destination for agricultural exports from the U.S. 
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(United States Census Bureau 2017). The balance of trade, as well as the direction of 
imports and exports, began shifting dramatically as the Korean economy developed. In 
the years since the KORUS FTA was passed, there have been numerous indicators that 
Korea’s exports have become more competitive in the international market and 
particularly in the U.S. market.  
In 2016, Korea was the 7th largest goods export market for the U.S. but also the 
6th largest supplier of imports (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2017a). 
During the first four years of the KORUS FTA10, the Korean trade surplus with the U.S. 
increased by 115% (United States Census Bureau 2017). While Korean exports to the 
U.S. increased substantially after the passage of the FTA, U.S. exports to Korea 
decreased substantially11. Although other trade agreements such as the NAFTA also led 
to major hikes in the U.S. trade deficit because of import growth outpacing export growth, 
in that case, the volume of U.S. exports to its trade partners remained the same. In 
comparison, the KORUS FTA was followed by a 9% decrease in U.S. exports of goods 
to Korea; even sectors which traditionally heavily to Korea were not exempt, as there 
was a 45.4% surge in Korean agricultural exports to the U.S. and a 5.4% decline in U.S. 
agricultural exports to the U.S. (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2017a). 
Moreover, the tremendous growth in Korea’s goods trade surplus is even more 
surprising given that the U.S. faced a 5% decrease in its trade deficit with the world 
                                            
 
10 The increase is calculated using the year before the KORUS FTA took effect and comparing 
it to the fourth year after implementation. 
11 The average monthly exports to Korea fell for 11 out of 15 sectors which usually export to 
Korea. The figures are relative to the volume of exports in the year before the FTA. 
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during the same post-FTA period. Korean exports to the U.S. increased by 19%, or 
roughly $11.5 billion, during a time when U.S. goods imports from the rest of the world 
decreased by 6%12 (United States Census Bureau 2017). Overall, these figures indicate 
that Korean firms have indeed been benefiting greatly from the removal of tariff barriers. 
[Figure 3] illustrates the distribution of Korea’s top ten industries with the highest trade 
surpluses. These categories, which are all in the manufacturing sector, represent 94.7% 
of South Korea’s overall product-category surplus. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses Formulation 
Heterogenous firms are bound to have varied responses to trade shocks from 
tariff reduction, and extant literature has examined characteristics which affect such 
responses. Since trade globalization is bi-directional, it presents both opportunities and 
constraints depending on the circumstances – for instance, abolishing import barriers 
may intensify product market competition but also represent growth through greater 
access to inputs while the reduction of partner countries’ trade barriers generates more 
opportunities through exports.  
 This thesis argues that both of these effects – the increase in product market 
competition as well as the generation of growth opportunities – can have a positive 
influence on firm performance. First, the removal of tariffs pushes firms that face greater 
                                            
 
12 The increase is calculated using the year before the KORUS FTA took effect and comparing 
it to the fourth year after implementation. 
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import competition in the domestic market to become exporters and capitalize on the 
growth opportunities. Second, as tariffs are reduced, the costs of production in the home 
country may fall; such is likely the case in Korea, where numerous industries depend on 
inputs from U.S. imports. Therefore, even the fall in import tariffs for Korea can generate 
higher firm performance for Korean firms, even those which do not necessarily 
participate in the export market. In line with previous literature elucidating the impact 
of outside directors and overall corporate governance structure on firms’ ability to 
exploit new opportunities (e.g. Minetti, Murro and Zhu 2015), the main hypothesis, then, 
seeks to examine whether the interaction of firms’ corporate governance and the increase 
in export opportunities together affect performance and facilitate value-maximizing 
behavior.  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive association between an increase in trade 
opportunities and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms with better corporate governance have a stronger positive 
association between trade opportunities and firm performance than firms with worse 
corporate governance. 
 The interaction of corporate governance and competition has been established 
in extant literature. Giroud and Mueller (2009) utilized the exogenous variations from 
the passage of business combination laws in the United States, which weakened 
corporate governance, to investigate whether the impact on operating performance was 
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different for firms in competitive versus noncompetitive industries. They found that 
competition mitigates agency problems, and thus, the worsening of corporate 
governance negatively affected performance in competitive industries but did not 
significantly impact firms in non-competitive industries. This is in line with what 
classical economists such as Hicks (1935) call the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis, which 
stipulates that managers of firms in non-competitive industries are more prone to 
managerial slack. Applying this to the context of this study, it is possible to formulate a 
hypothesis about the impact of corporate governance on firms’ response to the increase 
in foreign competition resulting from the reduction in import tariffs. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with better corporate governance have a weaker negative 
association between foreign competition and firm performance than firms with worse 
corporate governance. 
 Furthermore, firm heterogeneity is likely to induce variations in firms’ 
exposure to the FTA. Among these characteristics, productivity is an important 
consideration. Melitz (2003) suggests that high-productivity firms are more likely to 
benefit from trade liberalization because low-productivity firms are negatively affected 
by the increase in foreign trade. Hence, firm productivity is likely to impact the 
association between firm performance and trade opportunities. Additionally, research in 
corporate finance has proposed that high-productivity firms are ex ante more likely to 
have better corporate governance mechanisms (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001). In 
relation to productivity, firm size and firm age are also important, albeit indirect, 
measures of financial constraints since capital market imperfections are more likely to 
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negatively affect smaller and younger firms (Almeida et al. 2004). Therefore, it is 
expected that larger and older firms will show greater propensity for the interaction of 
corporate governance and trade opportunity. Also, a direct measure of firm productivity, 
total factor productivity (TFP), is hypothesized to have a parallel effect, i.e. more 
productive firms will benefit more from the interaction of the ratio of outside directors 
and the reduction of export tariffs. 
Hypothesis 3a: Larger and older firms will have a stronger positive association 
between the interaction of corporate governance and trade opportunities and firm 
performance than smaller and younger firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms that are more productive will have a stronger positive 
association between the interaction of corporate governance and trade opportunities 
and firm performance than less productive firms. 
 Industry-level characteristics are also likely to affect the results. Access to 
external finance becomes salient because the FTA may intensify competition or growth 
opportunity; in either case, firms would want to ensure that they have the resources to 
face the changes. Corporate governance becomes an important consideration in this 
regard, since corporate governance quality can moderate access to external capital 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Manova (2008) examined mechanisms through which 
credit constraints affected trade and found that weak financial institutions could hamper 
international trade flows since exporters would have restricted access to external capital.  
Taken together, the empirical literature suggests that corporate governance is most 
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important for firms in industries with high capital demands to respond to the dual 
competitive pressures of increased foreign competition and increased trade opportunity. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms in industries with greater dependence on external finance will 
have a stronger positive association between the interaction of corporate governance 
and trade opportunities and firm performance than firms in industries that with less 
dependence on external finance. 
 Additionally, the competitiveness of the industry is likely to be affected by the 
trade shock, thereby affecting the outcome. There are significant variations in the 
competitiveness of different Korean and U.S. industries, making generalization difficult 
without empirical proof. It is plausible, however, that the greatest opportunities for 
growth through trade were levied upon Korean industries which were more competitive 
than their U.S. counterparts since more competitive industries would be better equipped 
to handle a simultaneous increase in competition from imports and increase in 
opportunities to export. In line with protectionist arguments against trade, the U.S. would 
have placed the highest tariffs on industries which are less competitive (which would 
mean that Korean products are more competitive in those industries). While the 
reduction of tariffs can make less competitive firms more competitive, it is more likely 
that firms operating in industries which were ex ante more competitive would benefit 
from increased trade opportunities. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in industries that are more competitive relative to their 
counterparts in the U.S. will have a stronger positive association between the 
interaction of corporate governance and trade opportunities and firm performance 
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than firms in industries that are less competitive relative to their counterparts in the 
U.S. 
 
III. Data and Methods 
 
3.1 Data Sample and Sources 
The sampling frame was constructed using the TS2000 database of the Korea 
Listed Companies Association (KLCA), which provides comprehensive financial and 
nonfinancial data for publicly listed firms on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ indices in Korea. 
This study restricts its analysis to firms in the manufacturing sector13, excluding motor 
vehicles14, for the six-year period of 2009-2014. There are several reasons for limiting 
the sample to manufacturing firms and excluding the motor vehicle industry group. First, 
it is necessary to set all post-FTA tariffs to zero because as Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) 
point out, phase-out schedules for tariff removal create endogeneity problems. In 
KORUS, the tariff elimination schedule for manufactured goods is relatively 
straightforward and does not contain as many sensitive items15 as those for agricultural 
goods or services. However, since passenger vehicles have a phase-out schedule (from 
                                            
 
13 In the KSIC, the manufacturing sector includes industries with a two-digit KSIC code from 
10 to 33. Industry-specific data is measured at the four-digit and five-digit KSIC levels in this 
study. This is explained further in future sections. 
14 This study excludes firms in the motor vehicle industry group (four-digit HS code 3703 and 
two-digit KSIC code 30). 
15 Korea has numerous protections for its agricultural sector, and correspondingly, agriculture 
was the most sensitive sector in FTA negotiations. Passenger vehicles were the most sensitive 
item for manufactured goods and had numerous provisions for safety and environmental 
standards which could complicate the data. 
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8% to 4% and then zero after five years, which extends beyond the period of this study), 
excluding this industry group would improve the accuracy of the estimates. Second, the 
U.S. trade deficit in goods with Korea more than doubled in the years after KORUS 
came into effect, so it makes sense to exclude the services sector and focus on the 
industries that experienced the highest growth in trade opportunities (Office of the 
United States Trade Representative 2017b)16. Moreover, the top export categories for 
Korean goods to the U.S. were in the manufacturing sector17. However, although Korean 
auto exports to the U.S. increased, U.S. auto exports to Korea increased by 208% from 
2011 to 2015 (Office of the United States Representative 2017a). The extraordinary 
increase in foreign competition due to influx of U.S. auto imports would affect the data 
to measure growth in trade opportunity for firms in related industries. Third, some of the 
variables utilized in the estimations are only available for manufacturing industries. 
After omitting firms with missing variables or insufficient data, the final sample 
consists of 581 firms in 23 two-digit KSIC sectors and 4,996 firm-year observations. 
Data sources for firm, governance and industry variables come from the KCLA, the 
Korea Exchange (KRX), the DART repository of corporate filings system of the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), the FnGuide database, the KIS-Value database, and 
Statistics Korea. 
                                            
 
16 According to the 2017 Trade Policy Agenda Report, the U.S. trade deficit in goods was $27.6 
billion in 2016, up from $13.2 billion in 2011. In contrast, the U.S. services trade surplus with 
Korea trade has increased significantly after KORUS ($10.7 billion in 2016). 
17 According to the same aforementioned source, the top import categories in 2016 were 
vehicles, electrical machinery, pharmaceuticals, and mineral fuels.  
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3.2. Variable Construction 
3.2.1. Trade variables 
The main treatment in the specification comes from an exogenous measure: 
tariff reduction. Specifically, the change in export tariffs from the pre-FTA period (2009 
to 2011) to zero (2012 to 2014) measures the growth of trade opportunity for the industry. 
Industries with higher pre-FTA tariffs experienced the biggest changes, and thereby had 
the greatest increases to trade opportunity. This approach follows the methodological 
precedents of previous studies which utilized tariff reduction as a measure for growth 
opportunities and product market competition resulting from trade liberalization (see 
Tong and Wei 2014, Guadalupe and Wulf 2010). All sector-specific tariff data is from 
the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database of the World Bank, with 
supplementary data from the Tariff Analysis Online tool of the World Bank. Additional 
data on imports and exports comes from the UN Comtrade database. Products in these 
databases use the six-digit Harmonized System (HS) identification, which is the 
maximum level of disaggregation available. The maximum level of disaggregation for 
Korean firms is categorized by the five-digit Korean Standard Classification (KSIC) 
code, which is roughly equivalent to the four-digit U.S. SIC code (Caves and Bailey 
1992). A matching process ensured that the data was consolidated at the five-digit KSIC 
level. 
The KORUS FTA also eased the entry of U.S. goods into the Korean market. 
Thus, to account for the bilateral nature of KORUS, the change in foreign competition 
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is also calculated using the reduction in import tariffs (with data coming from the same 
source). Additionally, this study controls for the existing domestic concentration, since 
the level of competition in the target industry affects Korean firms’ ability to take 
advantage of the export opportunities. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
commonly employed as a measure of competition in empirical literature18, and many 
studies have used HHI as a main variable (see Giroud and Mueller 2011, Byun, Lee and 
Park 2012). The HHI data in this study is based on the four-digit KSIC level and sourced 
from Statistics Korea. 
3.2.2. Governance variables 
 The ratio of outside directors, coded as a dummy variable, is used as the main 
measure for firm-level corporate governance. For publicly listed firms, Korea strictly 
mandates the ratio of outside directors to board size. Firms with a book asset value above 
2 trillion won are legally required to have a board of directors comprised of at least 50% 
outside directors, while firms with a book asset value less than 2 trillion won are required 
to have a ratio of outside directors to board size of 25%. This regulation was put into 
place after the Asian financial crisis with the intention of improving the monitoring 
functions of independent directors (Chun 2016). The minimum threshold set by Korea’s 
statutory company law can be exploited to take advantage of the variations that occur 
when certain firms have outside directorship ratios which exceed the required minimum. 
                                            
 
18 Moreover, the HHI is also well-grounded in theory, making it a reliable measure of domestic 
concentration. 
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Also, scholars such as Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) have empirically proven that 
independent directors positively influence firm performance in Korea. This thesis 
assigns a dummy variable to the outside directorship ratio, coding 1 for firms with ratios 
that exceed the minimum (50% or 25%, depending on the firm’s asset size), and 0 
otherwise. 
 As a robustness check, this study employs institutional ownership 
concentration as an alternative measure of corporate governance. Additionally, foreign 
ownership concentration is tested as another alternative measure. In the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis, foreign equity ownership was no longer restricted, and thus 
foreign investors became an external governance mechanism (Choi, Park and Yoo 2007). 
3.2.3. Firm and industry variables 
 Firm performance is measured by the return on assets (ROA), which is a 
common variable employed in empirical literature and serves as the main dependent 
variable in this study. Two alternative measures of firm performance, Tobin’s Q and 
stock returns, are also tested. Other firm-level variables include firm asset size (dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if the firm asset size is above the median for firms within the same 
two-digit KSIC industry and 0 if otherwise), the natural log of firm age, and firm 
productivity (dummy variable, coded as 1 if the firm’s total factor productivity is greater 
than the median for firms within the same two-digit KSIC industry and 0 if otherwise). 
 Industry-level variables are also considered in the estimation model. In the 
baseline model, the industry average of the ROA (at the five-digit KSIC level) is 
calculated with the firm in question being excluded. Additionally, the competitiveness 
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of the Korean industry relative to the equivalent industry in the U.S. are considered. If 
Korean goods were competitive against U.S. goods in a particular industry, then it the 
positive effect of the trade shock would be more pronounced since the Korean goods 
would become even more competitive due to the removal of export tariffs.  
Firm-level and industry-level variables, their specific roles, and the method of 
calculation are explained further in the methodology section. [Table 2] summarizes the 
variables employed in this study. 
 
3.3. Empirical Strategy and Methodology 
This study employs two unique facets of the empirical setting to utilize 
difference-in-difference combined with a natural experiment. First, the methodology 
employs the ratio of outside directors to board size as the main measure of corporate 
governance. After the Asian financial crisis revealed the devastating of Korean firms’ 
virtually nonexistent) corporate governance mechanisms, Korea enacted its company 
statutory law mandating a specific minimum ratio of outside directors for publicly listed 
firms. This exogenous shock to corporate governance has been employed by many 
empirical studies (see, e.g., Baek, Kang and Park 2004, Cho and Kim 2007, Choi, Park 
and Yoo 2007, Black et al. 2015). A common finding of these studies is the positive 
correlation between the ratio of outside directors and firm performance, even if the 
magnitude is rather weak. Following this logic, this thesis asserts that firms which 
voluntarily comply beyond the mandated minimum ratio show greater concern for 
corporate governance and are not merely performing decoupled ‘symbolic’ actions 
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(Westphal and Zajac 1998). Since all listed firms are still required to have outside 
directors, the minimum ratio of outside directors can act as a ‘fixed effect’. Based on 
these ratios, there is a clear distinction between firms with ‘good’ corporate governance 
and those with ‘worse’ corporate governance. To supplement the findings, this study also 
utilizes alternative measures of governance. 
Secondly, this study exploits the KORUS FTA as an exogenous shock in trade 
opportunities. The FTA removed existing tariff barriers between the U.S. and Korea. 
Since the trade duties varied across different industries, then it is possible to quantify 
how the FTA influenced trade opportunity for Korean firms by utilizing each industry’s 
duties on exports to the U.S. in the pre-FTA period. This thesis theorizes that industries 
with higher export tariffs will experience a greater growth shock. Clausing (2001) and 
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) provide evidence of the opposite effect, i.e. that industries 
with higher import tariffs experience a greater competitive shock. Because trade 
opportunity and managerial incentives (i.e. corporate governance) are jointly determined 
as part of the industry equilibrium, it is difficult to establish an empirical relationship 
between governance and growth opportunity in this respect. This paper mitigates the 
challenges from this concern by exploiting an exogenous variation in the magnitude of 
trade opportunity. 
 There are several advantages to the proposed methodologies. First of all, there 
is potential for omitted factor bias if the main variables, corporate governance and trade 
opportunity, are represented solely on their cross-sectional measures since unobservable 
factors such as industry productivity could influence firms’ ability to take advantage of 
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trade opportunities. This thesis eliminates this concern by utilizing a trade shock, the 
KORUS FTA, in lieu of attempting to control for all potentially omitted variables.  
Second, there could be an endogeneity bias if corporate governance influences 
firm strategy in the product market. In industries where corporate governance is 
important for firm performance, growth opportunities could improve endogenously if 
firms implement managerial incentives to induce better firm performance. In response 
to such incentives, managers could become more competitive and seek out growth 
opportunities from trade in order to improve performance. Thus, trade opportunity could 
be a response to corporate governance and its interaction with corporate governance 
would have little empirical value. The approach utilized in this thesis evades the 
endogeneity problem by using export tariffs, which are decided at the level of the world 
economy and cannot be immediately affected by corporate governance mechanisms of 
individual firms. 
 Overall, this study directly confronts several methodological issues. The rich 
data on Korean firms together with the immediate cut in tariffs from the FTA enable the 
use of a panel data approach with firm fixed effects. Black et al. (2015) warned that the 
absence of fixed effects would give rise to the potential for unobserved firm-level factors, 
so the principal regressions include firm fixed effects. While firm fixed effects address 
time-invariant factors, an array of control variables address time-varying factors and year 
dummies are also included to further address variations over time that is common to all 
firms. 
The following section explains the methodologies in greater detail. 
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3.3.1. Baseline Model 
 First, a simple univariate regression tested the impact of the ratio of outside 
directors on ROA by classifying firms according to the dummy variable (i.e. firms with 
the minimum ratio of outside directors and firms with a higher ratio of outside directors) 
and utilizing pre-FTA and post-FTA three-year average ROA. The findings showed that 
firms with a minimum outside directorship ratio had, on average, a 3.4%19 greater drop 
in ROA compared to compared to firms with higher outside directorship ratios. This 
finding suggests that outside directorship ratios impacted how firms heterogeneously 





where i indexes firms, j indexes industry (five-digit KSIC), k indexes corporate 
governance (according to dummy), and t indexes time. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡, the return on assets, is 
the dependent variable which measures firm performance. To capture the change in the 
level of tariffs (and thereby in the levels of growth opportunity and foreign market 
competition), 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 measures the average tariffs on Korean exports to the U.S. for 
industry j in year t, and is interacted with a dummy that is equal to 0 after 2012. Likewise, 
                                            
 
19 t = 2.1 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑘𝑡 
  + 𝛽4𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑘𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
 ′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 +∝𝑗+  ∝𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡  
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𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 measures the average level of tariffs on imports from the U.S. in industry j, 
interacted with the same dummy. The coefficient of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡, 𝛽1, measures how ROA 
was affected by the increase in trade opportunities. It is expected that 𝛽1 will be positive, 
and more so for firms that with higher ratios of outside directors. 
 𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑘𝑡  is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the ratio of outside directors 
exceeds the minimum and 0 if otherwise. 𝛽2 is also expected to be positive, since better 
corporate governance is expected to lead to better firm performance. 𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑘𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the interaction term which measures how the increase in trade opportunity 
from the reduction in export tariffs varies as a function of corporate governance. In line 
with the main hypotheses that firms with better corporate governance perform better 
after a positive growth shock, 𝛽4 is expected to be positive. The null hypotheses for 𝛽4 
(i.e. 𝛽4  = 0) is that the expansion of trade opportunity uniformly affects all firms 
regardless of corporate governance., ∝𝑓  is firm fixed effects and ∝𝑡  is year fixed 
effects. 𝑋𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡 is the vector of controls (firm characteristics: size, the natural log of age, 
and one year lagged HHI) and 𝜀𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at 
the five-digit KSIC industry level. 
3.3.2. Firm and industry characteristics 
 To account for firm and industry heterogeneity, this thesis also explores 
whether firm-level and industry-level characteristics affect the results. First, firm asset 
size and firm age are indirect measures of firm-level productivity and financial 
constraints because capital market imperfections are more likely to negatively impact 
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smaller and younger firms, which are consequently less likely to be productive (Almeida 
et al. 2004). Firms are therefore classified according to size (i.e. below or above the 
industry median in 2011), and regressions are estimated separately. 
 Second, firm productivity explores whether more productive firms benefitted 
more greatly from trade liberalization. According to Melitz (2003), high-productivity 
firms are better able to maximize the gains from trade opportunities while low-
productivity firms are vulnerable to the negative effects of trade liberalization. Since 
firm age and firm performance serve as indirect measures of productivity, firm-level total 
factor productivity (TFP) is employed as a direct measure. The sample is divided 
according to comparative TFP in 2011, the year before the passage of the KORUS FTA, 
and separate regressions are estimated. 
 Third, relative industry competitiveness is measured to determine whether 
competitiveness of industries influenced the impact of the trade shock on firms. This 
thesis hypothesizes that Korean industries which were more competitive than their U.S. 
counterparts would experience greater opportunities for growth following trade 
liberalization. The competitiveness of the industry is measured by the difference between 
import and export tariffs, following the logic that a Korean industry with low import 
tariffs for U.S. goods and high export tariffs would be more competitive, since the tariff 
schedule would imply that Korean goods do not need any protection since they are 
competitive against U.S. goods in the same industry. Again, separate regressions are 
estimated for each subsample, divided by whether the difference between pre-FTA 
export and import tariffs for a Korean industry is negative or positive. 
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3.3.3. Alternative measures 
 This study employs an arsenal of alternative measures for dependent and 
independent variables to further test the robustness of results and strengthen its 
conclusions. First, institutional ownership serves as another proxy for corporate 
governance. Institutional investors serve as corporate monitors, and their role in 
corporate governance is widely recognized in management literature. Correspondingly, 
institutional ownership has often been utilized as a proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance across a wide range of studies. As with the main corporate governance 
variable, the ratio of outside directors, the relationship between institutional ownership 
and performance is well-documented in literature (see, e.g., Johnson and Greening 1999, 
Cornet et al. 2007).  
 Second, foreign ownership is tested as another alternative measure of corporate 
governance. Foreign investment is a governance mechanism because firms may be 
encouraged to adopt the sophisticated standards of good corporate governance that 
foreign owners may have. Foreign owners are also more likely to be completely 
independent, thereby representing the ultimate group of outsiders, and they could bring 
with them knowledge of international trade and management practices which could 
benefit the firm’s export strategy. For example, Fernandez and Nieto (2006) found that 
FDI facilitates exports by Chinese firms. Due to the nature of this variable (as there are 
firms with no foreign ownership), it is coded as a dummy. Thus, in this model, firms 
with no foreign investors are assumed to have worse governance. 
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 Third, two alternative dependent variables, Tobin’s q and stock returns are 
tested as an additional robustness check. Aside from the fact that these are often utilized 
as measures of firm performance in empirical studies, Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas 
(2010) measured the impact of outside directors on ROA, the log of Tobin’s q (which is 
computed so that the estimation regression coefficients have a percentage interpretation) 










4.1. Main Specification 
The results for the main specification are illustrated in [Table 3]. In Columns 
(1) and (2), the outside directorship dummy and the variable measuring the reduction in 
export tariffs are included to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, with Column (2) adding the 
control for industry HHI. In Columns (3) to (6), the main interaction effect is included 
to test Hypothesis 1c. To account for the bilateral nature of the FTA and test Hypothesis 
2, Column (5) also considers the reduction in import tariffs and Column (6) interacts this 
variable with outside directorship. Controls for industry HHI are added to Columns (4) 
to (6). 
Consistent with Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, there is indeed an interaction effect 
between corporate governance and trade liberalization which positively affects firm 
performance. The statistical findings of [Table 3] show that the impact of the ratio of 
outside directors on firm performance is positive and statistically significant, as is the 
coefficient of the reduction in export tariffs. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant at 1%, thereby supporting the hypothesis that better 
corporate governance amplifies the positive impact of trade opportunities for firms. The 
coefficient remains positive and statistically significant even when the reduction in 
import tariffs is introduced, but the interaction term did not produce a statistically 
significant result. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. However, this result is 
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meaningful nonetheless, since it shows that the findings are driven by the reduction in 
export tariffs rather than the increase in foreign market competition from U.S. goods. All 
findings are still positive and statistically significant after controlling for industry HHI. 
Overall, firms with better corporate governance had better operating 
performance resulting from an increase in trade opportunities after the reduction of 
export tariffs. However, corporate governance did not affect firms’ abilities to respond 
to product market competition in this study. 
 
4.2. Firm Characteristics 
[Table 4] illustrates how firm characteristics affected the estimates. Columns 
(1) and (2) classify firms according to size (above or below median in the sample in 
2011), and Columns (3) and (4) classify firms according to the number of years they 
have been listed (above or below median in the sample in 2011). The results show that 
for smaller firms, the impact of outside directors is close to zero and insignificant. By 
contrast, for larger firms, corporate governance had positive and significant effect on 
ROA. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant for both small 
and large firms, but the magnitude of the coefficient is much greater for the subsample 
of large firms. These results are parallel for younger and older firms. Thus, Hypothesis 
3a is supported. Interestingly, the impact of export tariffs on performance is significant 
only for smaller firms. 
 Columns (5) and (6) classify firms according to total factor productivity (TFP). 
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Again, the interaction term is positive and significant for both subsamples, and the 
magnitude is much larger – in this case, the coefficient for high TFP firms is more than 
double that of low TFP firms. These results indicate that the vulnerability of lower 
productivity firms to increases in foreign competition hampers the ability for those firms 
to benefit from trade liberalization. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is supported. 
 
4.3. Industry Characteristics 
 [Table 5] summarizes how industry characteristics influence the estimates. 
Regressions were calculated separately for subsamples classified by industry 
characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) separate firms based on the industry’s net change in 
capital. The results indicate that the positive effect on operating firms was mainly 
concentrated among firms with higher quality corporate governance in industries with 
lower dependence on external finance. However, the interaction between corporate 
governance and trade opportunities was not significant for firms operating in industries 
with high capital intensity. This finding suggests that firms which are reliant on external 
finance are unable to reap the benefits of trade liberalization, consistent with Manova 
(2008). Thus, Hypothesis 4 is only partially supported. 
Columns (3) and (4) include the competitiveness of industries in order to 
explore whether industries that are more competitive relative to their counterparts in the 
U.S. experienced a greater positive effect from the trade shock. The findings showed that 
the interaction coefficient is significant for both less competitive and more competitive 
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industries, and the magnitude is greater for more competitive industries; thus, 
Hypothesis 5 is supported. Notably, the positive impact of outside directors is only 
significant for firms which operate in less competitive industries. This suggests that 
corporate governance is more important for firms in industries which are not as 
competitive as their counterparts.  
 
4.4. Alternative Measures 
 [Table 6] shows the results for two alternative measures of corporate 
governance, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. As shown in Column (1), 
there is a positive and significant relationship between firm performance and ownership 
by institutional investors. However, the percentage of ownership held by foreigners did 
not have an independent positive effect on ROA. In support of the main hypothesis, the 
interaction between institutional ownership and trade opportunity is positive and 
statistically significant. Interestingly, although foreign ownership by itself did not affect 
firm performance, the interaction between foreign ownership and the reduction in export 
tariffs has a statistically significant influence on ROA. This suggests that firms with 
foreign ownership are possibly more likely to expand to global markets and therefore 
maximize the opportunities from the removal of export tariffs. 
 [Table 7] shows that for two alternative measures of firm performance, Tobin’s 
q and stock returns. As expected, the results are comparable and parallel to the results on 
the main dependent variable, ROA, although the magnitude is considerably less in the 
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case of stock returns. This is consistent with the trend of generally low stock returns 











In extant work, researchers have invariably highlighted the positive impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance and the opportunities for growth for firms 
after the removal of trade barriers. In the body of research where these two variables 
overlap, the vast majority of the focus has been on the nexus of corporate governance 
and competition. Building on agency theory and the view that trade liberalization 
increases firms’ export propensity and, this study has developed a theoretical framework 
that integrates the role of corporate governance in enhancing the benefits of trade 
liberalizations at the firm level. 
 Based on a sample of 581 firms across 23 industries, the results of this study 
indicate support for the theoretical predictions. Specifically, the estimation model found 
that Korean manufacturing firms on average enjoyed better firm performance after the 
reduction of export tariffs, and that better corporate governance enhanced this influence. 
Contrary to expectation, the reduction of import tariffs did not have a significant effect 
on firm performance, and neither did the interaction. Upon closer inspection, this result 
makes sense considering that many Korean manufacturers use U.S. imports of raw 
materials and other goods in their production processes. Therefore, even though there 
was presumably an increase in foreign competition, the benefit of reduced costs of 
productions dwarfed the potentially negative effects of intensified product market 
competition. Rather than competing with U.S. imports in the domestic market, it seems 
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more likely that Korean manufacturers enjoyed lower costs for materials from the U.S., 
which in turn improved the profitability of their export goods. 
These results align with the reality of the KORUS FTA, in which the rapid 
increase of Korean exports in goods to the U.S. occurred simultaneously with an actual 
decrease in U.S. goods exports to Korea. Additionally, the results also reflect the Korean 
economy’s export-orientated nature. The findings suggest that Korean firms did, in fact, 
take advantage of the growth in trade opportunities by joining the export market, and 
consistent with established theory on how trade liberalization induces even non-
exporters to expand their operations.  
Moreover, the findings were robust across firm-level and industry-level variables 
as well as alternative measures of corporate governance and firm performance. This 
suggests that the interaction effect of corporate governance and trade liberalization is 
especially relevant for firms in export-heavy sectors, such as manufacturing. [Table 8] 
summarizes the results for the hypotheses. 
 
5.1. Contributions to Literature 
 This study investigated how an increase in trade opportunities affects firms’ 
performance depending on the firm’s corporate governance. The empirical approach was 
based on two policies implemented in Korea: the mandatory ratio of outside directors to 
board size and the passage of the Korea-U.S. FTA. The KORUS FTA increased 
competitive pressures by increasing foreign competition, but as the results show, the 
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increase in trade opportunities from the reduction in export tariffs turned out to have a 
greater and more significant effect on firm performance. This is consistent with the 
Korean economy’s characterization as an export-oriented model. The bilateral nature of 
the FTA was considered by including both the cut in import tariffs and the cut in export 
tariffs in the empirical model, which adopted a combination of difference-in-difference 
models together with the observation that some firms opted to have outside directorship 
ratios that went beyond the minimum. 
Whereas nearly all prior research on corporate governance in Korea has focused 
on the post-Asian financial crisis era to exploit the exogenous shock from the new 
regulation on outside directorship as a natural experiment, this study shows that the role 
of outside directors is relevant nearly two decades later. Although the outside 
directorship system in Korea has received heavy criticism for being largely symbolic in 
nature, the results of this study reinforce the findings from extant literature that adding 
outside directors to the board improves firm performance, especially during times of 
high growth opportunities from trade. 
 Firm characteristics were also found to influence the outcomes of the estimates. 
Corporate governance was not found to affect smaller and younger firms, but when 
interacted with the increase in trade opportunities, the effect on firm performance was 
statistically significant across both characteristics. This enriches the extant literature by 
suggesting that in the context of smaller and younger firms, outside directors moderate 
the positive effects of the reduction of export tariffs. The effect of outside directors on 
smaller and younger firms can be explained by the likelihood of more concentrated 
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ownership (and less institutional ownership) for firms which are still in the early stages 
of development, but as the findings show, corporate governance matters for firms to take 
advantage of trade opportunities. In similar vein, higher productivity firms experienced 
a stronger interaction effect, but the interaction was also significant for lower 
productivity firms. This implies that amidst greater opportunities to participate in the 
export market, lower-productivity firms with better corporate governance mechanisms 
are able to improve productivity to maximize exporting gains. 
 The results depending on industry characteristics yielded some interesting 
findings. For firms with a high reliance on external finance, the interaction effect was 
not significant, making this the only case where the main result was not robust. One 
explanation for this outcome is that the need to raise external finance intensifies after 
competition increases. As the statistically significant association between the ratio of 
outside directors and firm performance in both classifications confirms, corporate 
governance enhances the capacity to attract such external finance. However, in industries 
with higher capital intensity, it is possible that the reliance on external finance impedes 
the ability to maximize trade opportunities, and this is not alleviated by better corporate 
governance. On the other hand, competitiveness of industry had expected results, namely 
that firms in industries which were more competitive to their U.S. counterparts benefited 
the most from the interaction effect. The statistically significant coefficient for less 
competitive firms also indicates that the removal of tariffs would have made such firms 
more competitive than before and induce them to become improve their operations. This 
is enhanced, once again, by better corporate governance. 
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 Evidence from the alternative estimation also confirmed the main hypothesis. 
Institutional investors also serve a monitoring function for corporate governance, and 
their role is unique because there is a propensity to liquidate investments rather than 
exercise appraisal rights or vote against the management. Since the Asian financial crisis, 
institutional investors in Korea have shown stronger interest in corporate governance 
and begun to reflect the global trend of shareholder activism. This has been influenced 
in part by the influx of foreign investors, and the empirical findings confirm that even 
different corporate governance mechanisms can amplify the positive effect of trade 
opportunities. In particular, foreign ownership as a corporate governance variable was 
only significant when interacted with trade liberalization. 
 
5.2. Limitations and Suggestions 
 
 Despite the methodological rigor of this study, there are several limitations. 
First of all, corporate governance is inherently endogenous. Reverse causality for the 
corporate governance – firm performance link remains an issue, as it is possible that 
better performing, more efficient, and more productive firms were the most likely to 
increase their ratio of outside directors beyond the mandated minimum. In the case of 
Korea, the true impact of corporate governance has remained somewhat ambiguous; 
while empirical literature finds a positive link to firm performance, the pervasiveness of 
the ‘Korea Discount’ and other criticisms of corporate transparency point to fundamental 
weaknesses in Korea’s corporate governance structure. This study addressed this 
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concern by utilizing institutional ownership and foreign ownership as alternative 
measures, and future work may benefit from employing other variables such as CEO 
equity ownership. Additionally, regulations on corporate governance mechanisms 
should be exploited as endogenous shocks. For example, the recent law banning new 
cross-shareholdings among chaebols 20  may yield significant findings in the future. 
Another line of inquiry could be related to principal-principal problems, which are 
especially prominent for Korean firms. 
 Secondly, although the KORUS FTA was indeed economically significant for 
both the Korean and the U.S. economies, it was negotiated over the course of five years. 
The anticipation of the KORUS FTA enactment may have influenced the results and 
violated the parallel trends hypotheses that would validate the findings. Future studies 
may want to incorporate a placebo policy which assumes that the FTA was already 
expected in 2005, since negotiations were first publicly announce in early 2006. A 
placebo test for each year between negotiations and enactment (2006 to 2012) could also 
help decrease the likelihood of omitted variable bias.  
Moreover, there is a possibility that another large-scale exogenous trade shock 
– the enactment of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement 21  in 2011 – may have 
                                            
 
20 In 2014, the new cross-shareholding ban in Korea took effect. Although the new regulation 
effectively banned newly issued cross-shareholding arrangements without explicit bans on 
existing ones, many chaebols have already begun to eradicate circular investments and shift to a 
holding company system. 
21 In 2011, the EU-KOREA FTA came into effect. By 2016, it had increased trade between the 
two partners by 55%, and South Korea rose to become one of the EU’s top ten export markets. 
For example, European car sales in Korea have tripled since the FTA was enacted. 
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confounded the results, given the breadth of both trade agreements as well as the similar 
timing. This study did not control for the EU-Korea FTA. However, the EU-Korea FTA 
significantly increased European exports to Korea and induced a trade surplus; thus, 
trade liberalization in this context would have increased product market competition 
rather than the opportunities for growth through trade. Hence, the findings from this 
thesis are meaningful on their own, but future research agendas may want to control for 
other FTAs, or possibly even consider multiple trade agreements simultaneously for a 
more comprehensive study of the impact of trade liberalization on market structure.  
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Dummy variable; equal to 1 if the ratio of outside 
directors to board size is above the required 
minimum* and 0 if otherwise 
Institutional ownership 
Percentage of firm ownership held by institutional 
investors 
Foreign ownership 




Change in export tariffs 
on Korean goods to U.S. 
Difference between the average pre-FTA export 
tariffs for each industry (KSIC 5-digit; 2009-2011) 
and zero 
Change in import tariffs on 
U.S. goods to Korea 
Difference between the average pre-FTA import 
tariffs for each industry (HS 6-digit; 2009-2011) and 
zero 
Pre-FTA export tariffs on 
Korean goods to U.S. 
Average pre-FTA export tariffs on Korean goods to 
the U.S. (HS 6-digit; 2009-2011) 




Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
assets 
Log of Tobin’s q 
Log of the ratio of total market value of firm (i.e. 
market value of common stock and book values of 
preferred stock and total liabilities) to the total asset 
value of firm (book value of total assets) 
Stock returns 
Average monthly returns for each fiscal year in the 
study period 
Firm asset size (large or 
small) 
Dummy variable; equal to 1 if the firm has an asset 
size that is greater than the median for firms within its 
industry (KSIC 2-digit) and 0 if otherwise 
Log of firm size Log of sales revenue 
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Log of firm age Log of the number of years that firm has been listed 
Firm productivity (high or 
low) 
Dummy variable; equal to 1 if the firm's total factor 
productivity is greater than the median for firms 
within its industry (KSIC 2-digit) and 0 if otherwise 
Industry Variables 
Industry average 
Average ROA across all firms, excluding firm in 
question, in each industry (KSIC 5-digit) 
Capital intensity (high or 
low) 
Dummy variable; equal to 1 if the industry's net 
change in capital is higher than the sample median 
and 0 if otherwise 
Industry competitiveness 
(high or low) 
Dummy variable; equal to 1 if firm’s five-digit KSIC 
industry import tariffs from U.S. were lower than its 
export tariffs to the U.S. prior to 2012 
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　 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0068** 0.0052** 0.0049** 0.0042** 0.0033* 0.0033*
[0.0168] [0.0141] [0.0145] [0.0155] [0.0141] [0.0150]
0.0253** 0.0261* 0.0395*** 0.0361**
  [0.0235] [0.0211] [0.0165] [0.0157]
0.1058** 0.1014** 0.0198 0.1089 0.1221 0.1225
[0.0261] [0.0234] [0.0210] [0.0206] [0.0178] [0.0155]
 0.0079* 0.0011*
    [0.0117] [0.0309]
     0.0068
     [0.0428]
0.1009*** 0.1023*** 0.1009*** 0.1021*** 0.1112*** 0.1112***
[0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0066] [0.0059] [0.0059]
0.0083*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 0.0085*** 0.0081***
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
0.0315*** 0.0205** 0.0318*** 0.0210** 0.0208** 0.0208**
[0.0056] [0.0101] [0.0056] [0.0099] [0.0093] [0.0093]
0.1351*** 0.1659*** 0.1355*** 0.1656*** 0.1351*** 0.1351***
[0.0336] [0.0324] [0.0336] [0.0321] [0.0283] [0.0280]
 0.0966***  0.0979*** 0.0685*** 0.0685***
 [0.0265]  [0.0254] [0.0254] [0.0251]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.6170 0.6170 0.6170 0.6350 0.6360 0.6360
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Firm asset size
Firm asset size squared






Change in export tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
Change in export tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
Change in import tariffs on
U.S. goods to Korea
Outside directorship *
Change in import tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Institutional ownership
Institutional ownership *
Change in export tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
Change in export tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership * Change
in export tariffs on Korean
goods to U.S.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: ROA
Change in export tariffs on
Korean goods to U.S.
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Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between corporate 
governance and firm performance. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive association between an 
increase in trade opportunities and firm performance. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms with better corporate governance have a 
stronger positive association between trade opportunities and 
firm performance than firms with worse corporate governance. 
Supported 
  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with better corporate governance have a 
weaker negative association between foreign competition and 
firm performance than firms with worse corporate governance. 
Not Supported 
  
Hypothesis 3a: Larger and older firms will have a stronger 
positive association between the interaction of corporate 
governance and trade opportunities and firm performance than 
smaller and younger firms. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms that are more productive will have a 
stronger positive association between the interaction of 
corporate governance and trade opportunities and firm 
performance than less productive firms. 
Supported 
  
Hypothesis 4: Firms in industries with greater dependence on 
external finance will have a stronger positive association 
between the interaction of corporate governance and trade 
opportunities and firm performance than firms in industries that 
with less dependence on external finance. 
Partially Supported 
  
Hypothesis 5: Firms in industries that are more competitive 
relative to their counterparts in the U.S. will have a stronger 
positive association between the interaction of corporate 
governance and trade opportunities and firm performance than 
firms in industries that are less competitive relative to their 
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본 연구는 기업지배구조와 무역 자유화의 상호작용 효과가 기업 
성과에 미치는 영향을 실증적 분석으로 검증하는 것을 궁극적인 목표로 
한다. 요 근래 수십 년간 세계무역의 증가율이 세계GDP의 증가율을 
앞지르면서 무역 자유화가 시장구조에 미치는 영향에 대한 관심이 급증하고 
있다. 무역장벽이 제거 되면 기업은 더욱 치열한 시장 경쟁을 직면하게 
되지만 동시에 무역 자유화를 통해 국가 간의 장벽이 낮아지면 기업은 
새로운 성장 기회를 누리게 된다. 본 논문에서는 기업이 이러한 새로운 
성장 기회를 최대한 활용할 수 있게 하는 여러 요인 중에서 기업지배구조의 
영향을 제시하고자 한다. 이를 보이기 위해 본 연구는 코스피·코스닥 상장 
기업 데이터를 면밀히 검토한다. 우선, 2012년 한-미 FTA의 발효로 FTA 
전후 관세율의 변화를 외재적 변수로 활용하여 ‘트레이드 쇼크’ (trade 
shock)가 기업 성과에 미치는 영향을 살펴볼 수 있는 유사 실험 상황이 
만들어 졌다. 또한 한국이 1997 IMF 사태 후에 법적으로 도입한 
사외이사제도를 활용하여 각 기업의 사외이사 선임율을 이용하여 
기업지배구조 변수를 간편하게 가변수로 코딩할 수 있고, 이 역시 기업 
성과에 미치는 효과를 분석 할 수 있다. 기업 데이터를 활용해서 두 변수의 
상호작용 효과를 계량 경제 모델로 분석하고 기업특징 및 산업특징 관련 
통제 변수와 함께 분석한 결과, 기업지배구조가 우수한 기업들이 무역 
자유화로 인해 생성되는 성장 기회를 보다 더 잘 활용 하는 것을 보인다. 
본 논문을 통해 무역 자유화 이후 기업 성과에 영향을 미치는 
기업지배구조의 역할에 대한 새로운 시점을 제시할 수 있다. 
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